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Abstract 
One of the most consistent findings in experimental social dilemmas research is the positive 
effect group discussion has on cooperative behavior. At a time when cooperation and 
consensus is critical to tackle global problems, ranging from debt to deforestation, 
understanding the dynamics of group discussion is a pressing need. Unfortunately, research 
investigating both the underlying processes and implementation of the effect has slowed. We 
present a critical review of existing explanations and integrate these perspectives into a single 
process model of group discussion, providing a more complete theoretical picture of how 
interrelated factors combine to facilitate discussion-induced cooperation. On the basis of this 
theoretical analysis, we consider complimentary approaches to the indirect and feasible 
implementation of group discussion. We argue that such strategies may overcome the barriers 
to direct discussion observed across a range of groups and organizations.  
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The Group Discussion Effect: Integrative Processes and  
Suggestions for Implementation 
One of the most challenging tasks facing our society is the enabling of balanced and 
equitable distribution of limited natural resources. At the heart of these problems lies a 
distinctly social psychological process: non-cooperation. Examples of how non-cooperation 
can exacerbate, or even cause, resource depletion are easy to find. England is currently facing 
its worst droughts in more 30 years. In attempt to reduce the strain on water reserves Thames 
Water recently launched a river awareness campaign. A representative for the company stated 
that the aim of the campaign is to communicate to users that “we’re all in this together, we 
need everyone to value water and use a little bit less” (BBC News, 2011). This plea was an 
attempt to avoid a crisis that would be almost entirely social in origin: failing to conserve 
water would create a shortage. Such dilemmas represent truly psychological phenomena, 
resting upon the potential for groups – sometimes on an incredibly wide scale – to cooperate 
and reach consensus in a way that ensures mutual interest and sustainable existence. This 
article is about these dilemmas, and how establishing integrated, process-orientated 
theoretical frameworks may help fashion new perspectives and new solutions to the dilemmas 
we, as societies, face. 
The Social Dilemma  
Hardin’s (1968) famous parable of the “Tragedy of the Commons” provides a classic 
illustration of the social dynamics underlying environmental dilemmas. Hardin describes a 
communal pasture upon which local herdsmen are permitted to graze cattle for free. In this 
situation it is individually rational for herdsmen to increase their herd, and consequently, their 
profit. However, if everyone reasons accordingly, the pursuit of self-interest will lead to 
collective disaster as the pasture become overgrazed and all cattle are lost. This situation can 
be conceptualized as a ‘social dilemma’. Social dilemmas occur when individuals must 
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decide between behavior that benefits the self and behavior that benefits the collective. The 
dilemma arises because individuals are always better off when they choose the personally 
rewarding, non-cooperative choice. Yet, if all individuals defect everyone will end up worse 
off than if they all choose the collectively rational, cooperative choice (Dawes, 1980). 
Almost daily it seems scientists’ prognosis of the state of the planet becomes 
increasingly dire.  As our knowledge of the scale of environmental challenges grows, we 
must consider the inadequacy of the current approaches to these challenges. It is crucial for 
experimental social dilemmas research to find means to reinforce individual restraint within 
these environmental challenges, as well as other pressing societal problems which have the 
characteristics of a social dilemma including, issues of population growth, overfishing, the 
provision of public services, contribution to local neighbourhood watch schemes, and 
elimination of the budget deficit.     
 One of the most promising findings amongst this research is that individual group 
members are more likely to act cooperatively if they are first given the chance to discuss the 
dilemma with one another. In fact, a meta-analysis of 35 years of social dilemmas research 
concluded that communication was the strongest and most reliable predictor of cooperative 
behavior (Sally, 1995). Explaining this effect has, however, been a challenge. Several 
competing explanations regarding the psychological mechanisms underlying the 
communication effect have been the subject of theoretical debate.  Moreover, despite the 
strength of the group discussion effect, coupled with its significant potential to increase social 
harmony, research surrounding the effect has been less impactful than hoped.  
 Reinforcing these concerns, a number of critical reviews have raised some serious 
doubts about both the theoretical basis and the external validity of experimental social 
dilemmas research. Komorita and Parks (1995), for instance, condemned existing theoretical 
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models as “superficial”, failing to specify how interrelated factors combine to facilitate 
cooperation, while Pruitt and Kimmel (1977) noted a reluctance to extrapolate findings from 
the laboratory to real-life. In light of these concerns Komorita and Parks (1995) urge 
researchers to become more “process-orientated”, pulling together results to provide a more 
complete theoretical picture of how cooperation evolves. Pruitt and Kimmel similarly 
formulated a prescription for future social dilemmas research to address “theory building 
within a context of a concern about real-life applications” (p. 370).   
While contemporary research has shown some progress towards increasing the 
conceptual scope and ecological validity of some constructs within social dilemmas research 
(e.g. Joireman et al., 2001; Tyler & Degoey, 1995; Van Vugt, 2001), such improvements 
have not been apparent within the group discussion paradigm.  Research has stalled in a state 
of disagreement regarding the processes underlying the communication effect, whilst 
applications have been discouraged by the realisation that discussion amongst all decision 
makers is often difficult to establish (Samuelson & Watrous-Rodriguez, 2009).   
With the aim of bringing the field more in line with prescriptions, we present an 
integrated process model of the group discussion effect.  Employing models of group 
development as a corroborating framework, we argue that discussion groups faced with a 
social dilemma routinely pass through four stages of orientation, conflict, consensus and 
group decision (see Figure 1).  Aspects of previously competing explanations are described to 
provide incremental contributions toward discussion-induced cooperation in an additive 
fashion. We hope that providing this comprehensive, encompassing theory will provide a 
framework from which effective applications can be derived.  
Overview 
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First, we present an overview of the group discussion effect and introduce the 
competing explanations for the effect. In Part 2 we provide a narrative roadmap for our 
process model of group discussion in the form of classic models of group development. In 
Part 3 we argue that the available evidence points to the conclusion that multiple processes 
operate simultaneously to enhance cooperation within group discussions and incorporate 
these previously competing explanations into an encompassing process model of group 
discussion. Finally, in Part 4 we consider the implications of this model. We justify the 
additive nature of our model and detail how this framework can guide future exploration. 
Finally we consider the pragmatic problems of face-to-face discussion and argue that one 
solution is the use of indirect discussion-based strategies, grounded by our integrated 
theoretical model.  
I. The Group Discussion Effect 
A number of solutions to increase cooperative behavior within social dilemmas have 
been empirically advanced. Some of the most established solutions include the conversion of 
public goods into privately owned resources (e.g. Messick & McClelland, 1983) appointing 
an agent who has authority over the provision of a common resource (e.g. Samuelson & 
Messick, 1995), supplementing incentives for cooperation (Wit & Wilke, 1990) and likewise 
imposing sanctions for defection (e.g. Caldwell, 1976; Kerr, 1999; Kerr et al., 2006; Wit & 
Wilke, 1990). Among solutions most conductive to cooperation, however, is group 
discussion.  
In the earliest investigation of the effectiveness of group discussion, Deutsch (1958) 
found that participants cooperated on 71% of trials of a prisoner’s dilemma game when they 
could communicate with their partner, compared to only a 36% cooperation rate on trials 
where communication was prohibited. Since this seminal work ample research has confirmed 
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the strength and reliability of the group discussion effect. In fact, a meta-analysis reviewing 
35 years of social dilemmas research concluded that task-related communication was the 
strongest and most reliable predictor of cooperative behavior, relative to other variables 
known to influence cooperation (including group size, group identification and the size of the 
reward for defection; Sally, 1995).  
From a rational economic perspective, this finding is anomalous; group discussion 
does not alter the objective incentive structure of the dilemma, and thus should not be 
expected to influence individuals’ behavior.  Psychological research has, however, 
established that the group discussion effect represents a reliable manifestation of group 
process. The facilitating effect of discussion has been shown to prevail across manipulations, 
including pre-game discussion (e.g. Dawes, McTavish & Shaklee, 1977), pre-trial discussion 
within multi-trial games (e.g. Kerr, Garst, Lewandowski & Harris, 1997) and continuous 
discussion (e.g. Isaac & Walker, 1988), as well as across task variants including prisoners’ 
dilemmas (e,g. Braver & Barnett, 1976; Voissem & Sistrunk, 1971), public goods dilemma 
(e.g. Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliand, 1994; Orbell, van de Kragt & Dawes, 1988), and resource 
dilemmas (e.g. Brechner, 1977; Liebrand, 1984).   
However, while it is beyond empirical dispute that group discussion facilitates 
cooperative behavior, there is less consensus regarding why, i.e. what are the psychological 
mechanisms underlying this effect. We identify three principle explanations amongst the 
literature: 1. group identity, 2. perceived consensus, and 3. group problem-solving. The group 
identity perspective suggests that discussion creates a common bond among members and 
bolsters group identity. This enhanced group identity is presumed to increase concern for 
group-level, rather than individual-level outcomes, thus increasing the likelihood of the 
cooperative choice (e.g. Dawes et al., 1977; Dawes, Orbell & van de Kragt, 1990). The 
perceived consensus approach, on the other hand, suggests that discussion facilitates 
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cooperation by offering group members the opportunity to develop and become committed to 
a majority-based group consensus to cooperate (e.g. Bouas & Komorita, 1996; Kerr & 
Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994).  The group problem-solving approach, conversely argues that only 
a minority of active advocates of the cooperative choice is required to carry the group to a 
cooperative decision within discussions (Hopthrow & Abrams, 2010; Hopthrow & Hulbert, 
2005).   
While several authors have previously acknowledged the conclusion that one or more 
process may operate simultaneously to enhance cooperation (e.g. Chen, 1996; Samuelson & 
Watrous-Rodriguez, 2009), this review is the first to substantiate this approach. We propose 
that discussion groups progress in a unitary sequence through a series of stages within which 
multiple psychological mechanisms additively contribute to the fulfilment of a group goal. 
We now present an overview of linear models of group development to provide a narrative 
roadmap for the sequence defined within our model.  
II. Roadmap: Models of Group Development 
One of the most frequently cited models of group development is that of Tuckman 
(1965). Based upon a meta-analysis of research examining interaction patterns amongst 
groups, Tuckman’s model describes four stages through which both task and social groups 
are said to progress over time - forming, storming, norming and performing.  
According to Tuckman (1965), the first stage of group development, as the group 
comes together as a definite object for the first time, is focused upon group members gaining 
an understanding of the task at hand. The group is said to synthesise information with the aim 
of establishing the task parameters and the resources required for task accomplishment. 
Tuckman describes forming as a fairly comfortable phase of group development within which 
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an identity as group members begins to emerge as a result of information sharing and 
agreement on a common view of the task.  
Once group members have begun to build a rapport and feel more secure, Tuckman 
(1965) suggests that groups enter a stage of storming in which ideas as to the best ways to 
progress with the task at hand compete for ascendancy. This is said to represent a relatively 
uncomfortable phase characterized by conflict as group members compete for roles and try to 
assert their own personal preferences about how the task should be solved.  Clarity of purpose 
is said to improve within this stage, but plenty of uncertainties still persist. 
Gradually groups progress into a more harmonious norming stage. Within this stage, 
group members are said to develop mutual clarity with respect to the task at hand and 
establish either explicit or implicit rules about how they will achieve their goal as a group. 
Members are said to develop their own set of norms through this consensus, which they 
subsequently try to abide by.  During this phase, group members begin to accept the vital 
contribution of others as some group members must abandon their initial opinions and agree 
with others for the group to function successfully.  
Finally, Tuckman (1965) suggests that groups reach a stage of performing. The 
energy of the group is channelled as members make constructive attempts towards task 
accomplishment. Members can be highly autonomous within this stage, but possess a shared 
vision and know clearly why and what they are doing without re-examining the full range of 
alternatives originally considered by the group.  
The structure of Tuckman’s (1965) model is also mirrored within other models of 
group development and group decision-making, including that of Bales and Strodtbeck 
(1951) Fisher (1970) Woodcock (1979) and Wheelan (1990). Although these phase models 
differ from one another in emphasis, there is a basis agreement that groups evolve through a 
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pattern of lack of clarity, to conflict, to a stage of agreement and norm formation prior to the 
achievement of group goals. We do not employ Tuckman’s model as a theoretical basis for 
our model, nor suggest that such models represent a valid description of the group discussion 
effect within social dilemmas. We do, however, perceive the sequence characterizing models 
of group development to provide a roadmap for the sequence in which we suggest distinct 
multiple mechanisms contribute towards discussion-induced cooperation.  
III. The Process Model of Group Discussion 
While there is little agreement regarding the mechanisms underlying the group 
discussion effect, authors are in agreement that greater clarity is necessary to advance the 
development of more effective discussion-based interventions for real-world dilemmas 
(Kopelman, Weber & Messick, 2002; Orbell, van de Kragt & Dawes, 1991; Samuelson & 
Watrous-Rodriguez, 2009). Two distinct camps exist amongst scholars in regard to how this 
aim should be achieved. The first perspective argues that the objective should be towards 
separating the effects of divergent accounts (e.g. Orbell et al.,1991) While the contrasting 
approach favors an inadequately explored argument that different mechanisms work more 
interactively towards facilitating cooperation (e.g. Samuelson &  Watrous-Rodriguez, 2009).  
Our integrative approach aims to draw a line under competitive tests which have now 
led to a standstill within the field, and argue that previous research leads to the conclusion 
that rather than representing mutually exclusive explanations, aspects of each of the existing 
‘single-cause’ explanations can be synthesized into an encompassing process model within 
four stages of orientation, conflict, consensus and group decision.  We do not perceive any of 
these stages, on their own, to be sufficient to enable the robust communication effect that is 
routinely observed. Rather, each stage is said to form a necessary element of a sequence 
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enabling an incrementally more powerful effect. We now outline the contributions of each 
stage in turn.   
Orientation  
 We posit that within the first stage of discussion group members attempt to achieve a 
common understanding of the task at hand. When groups are first presented with a dilemma, 
the incentive structure and precise nature of interdependence between group members is 
likely to be unclear. Early task-related discussion serves to clarify this complexity and reveal 
the underlying dilemma embedded within the task.  As a consequence of this initial 
discussion, we suggest self-perception begins to transform from the individual-level towards 
the group-level.  
The group identity explanation of the communication effect is founded upon classic 
studies within the minimal group paradigm that have repeatedly demonstrated the powerful 
influence of ad-hoc in-group vs. out-group categorisations on individuals’ allocation 
decisions (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1975).  According to Dawes and colleagues, a 
period of task-related group discussion serves to make common category membership salient 
and represents a far more substantial manipulation than minimal group distinctions (e.g. 
Dawes et al., 1977; Dawes et al., 1990). Accordingly, group discussion is expected to create a 
common bond amongst members and bolster group members’ identification with their group. 
Such identification is presumed to increase concern for group-level, rather than individual-
level outcomes, thus increasing the likelihood of the cooperative choice. 
Cited as evidence for this approach Dawes et al. (1977) compared the effectiveness of 
four communication conditions on cooperative behavior 1) a no communication, control 
condition, 2) task-irrelevant group discussion, 3) task-relevant group discussion and 4) task-
relevant discussion followed by a non-binding declaration of intended choices. Results 
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demonstrated that cooperation rates were low in the control and task-irrelevant discussion 
conditions (27% & 35% respectively), but were significantly increased in the task-relevant 
discussion groups (74% & 84%). The difference in cooperation rates between these latter 
conditions was not significant. The authors interpreted the difference between task-irrelevant 
and task-relevant communication as evidence for the group identity explanation, arguing that 
unless the dilemma is discussed, bolstered identification with the group will not occur. In this 
case, any cooperative behavior is motivated by egoistic concerns of external gain. In the 
presence of task-relevant discussion, however, bolstered identification explains the dramatic 
increase in cooperation. 
We do not however, uncritically accept Dawes’ and colleagues (1977) ad-hoc 
argument here. It is not clear, why if, as the minimal group paradigm shows, categorisation is 
sufficient to create a social identity and subsequent in-group biases, would discussion of the 
dilemma per se would be needed. Thus, while Dawes and colleagues suggest that the 
differences in levels of cooperation between conditions is indicative of insufficient group 
identity within the task-irrelevant condition, this effect of task relevancy could also be 
interpreted as evidence that group identity in itself is insufficient to enable robust cooperation 
(Bouas & Komorita, 1996).   
Despite this critique, subsequent findings prevent us from ruling out the contributory 
role of identification processes. One such study is provided by Van de Kragt, Dawes, Orbell, 
Braver and Wilson (1986).  The authors manipulated whether the cooperative choice 
benefited both the self and other group members (contingent condition), or just others (non-
contingent condition). Prior to making their anonymous individual investment decisions half 
of the groups in each rule condition discussed the dilemmas, while the control groups 
remained silent.  Results revealed an effect of self-interest, whereby the contingency rule 
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elicited higher rates of cooperation than the non-contingency rule. This effect was not 
however, apparent within discussion groups.  That is, higher rates of cooperation were 
obtained in the non-contingency condition despite the fact that the benefits of doing so 
accrued only to other members’ outcomes.   Thus, supporting the group identity perspective, 
group discussion enhanced cooperation when any egoistic incentives to cooperate were 
removed and cooperation was purely for the benefits of other group members. Indeed a 
subsequent investigation from Caporael, Dawes, Orbell and van de Kragt (1989) reported that 
the content of group discussion implied a growing sense of identity as the majority of 
participants cited the welfare of the group when asked why they choose to cooperate 
following a period of discussion. It seems that following group discussion, the collective 
rather than the individual increasingly becomes the referent, (i.e. “what should ‘we’ do”). In 
this way group identity is said to contribute towards cooperative behavior that is independent 
of the consequences for the choosing individual (Dawes et al., 1990). 
While we are compelled not to reject the role of group identification in discussion-
induced cooperation all together, we contest the notion that group identification alone 
explains discussion induced cooperation, precisely because the available evidence does not 
support the sufficiency of group identification to ensure cooperation, nor, can the 
alternatively reality of multiple causal factors at work be ruled out (e.g. Bornstein, Rapoport, 
Kerpel & Katz, 1989;  Bouas & Komorita, 1996; Chen & Komorita, 1994; Kerr and 
Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994). Accordingly, we do not terminate the process model here. Rather, 
we see group identification as playing a contributing role towards cooperative behavior, 
preceding and catalysing subsequent stages within the process model which serve to enable a 
more powerful communication effect.  
To summarise, we argue that within the first stage of group discussion the nature of 
the dilemma becomes well-defined, but appropriate social behavior is not yet established. The 
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primary consequence of initial discussion is the enabling of group identification processes. 
We do not suggest that group identification is a dichotomous state and initial discussion is 
adequate to instil such a state.  Rather, we argue that social categorization exist in a 
continuum (Tajfel, 1981) and begins to move towards shared category membership with 
resultant reordering of priorities within this phase of discussion. Equally, we do not suggest 
identification processes are restricted to this stage of discussion, instead we argue that 
identification processes precede and  catalyze further processes facilitating mutual 
cooperation in the face of the tug of self-interest.  
Conflict 
We describe a lack of unity within the second stage of the process model as groups 
address a conflict of interest between individual and social rationality. Within this debate a 
‘cooperation-supported-wins’ decision scheme is said to emerge, characterising this stage of 
discussion. We argue that the emergence of this preference is enabled by a shared conceptual 
scheme amongst group members and facilitated by enhancements in group identity enabled 
within the prior phase of discussion.  
Laughlin and Ellis (1986) distinguish between two types of decision-making tasks: 
intellective and judgemental. Intellective tasks yield objective, ‘correct’ answers that are 
selected by the group as long as it contains one member who can successfully solve the 
problem and demonstrate the correctness of the alternative to the rest of the group. 
Judgemental tasks, on the other hand, require evaluative judgement; no correct answer can be 
authoritively determined. If social dilemmas represented a purely intellective task, we would 
expect mutual cooperation to be easier to encourage and would we not expect any deviation 
from this ‘answer’ once it is pointed out. Mutual cooperation is, however, unstable. No 
intervention has been shown to maintain 100% cooperation over time. Accordingly, we 
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perceive social dilemmas to be are more analogous to judgemental tasks, within which 
mutual cooperation represents an ‘optimal’ rather than the objectively ‘correct’ alternative. 
The group problem-solving approach (Hopthrow & Abrams, 2010; Hopthrow & 
Hulbert, 2005) integrates Laughlin and Ellis’s (1986) framework into the social dilemmas 
domain to explain the group discussion effect. It is argued that given the structure of social 
dilemmas, it is uncommon for a group to contain a majority of people pre-disposed to act 
cooperatively. Given the robustness of the group discussion effect, the authors therefore 
suggest that it is more plausible that discussion enables a ‘cooperation-supported-wins’ 
decision scheme to influence the group (Davis, 1973). It is suggested that this decision 
scheme emerges because the social situation inherent within group discussions leads group 
members to perceive mutual cooperation as the optimal solution.  
 Support that group process can serve to demonstrate the optimality of the mutually 
cooperative solution is provided by Hopthrow and Abrams (2010). The authors tested 
whether discussion produced cooperative behavior even when all group members hold a 
unanimous initial preference for the non-cooperative choice. Previous research has shown 
that even when group members hold the same initial opinion, discussion can encourage 
groups to consider possible alternatives and promote decisions that diverge from original 
preferences (Parks & Nelson, 1999). Hopthrow and Abrams (2010) proposed that such 
reassessment may be more likely under conditions emphasizing the utility of mutual 
cooperation and thus exposing a convincing rationale for cooperation.  
To test this prediction, participants were presented with a prisoner’s dilemma within 
which the demonstrable optimality of mutual cooperation was manipulated by altering the 
dominance of the non-cooperative choice whilst keeping the k’ parameter constant 
(Komorita, 1976). Individual’s initial pre-discussion preference was used to assign them to 
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entirely cooperative or non-cooperative groups. After a discussion period groups were asked 
to form a group decision for either a) mutual cooperation, b) mutual defection or c) a mixed 
decision. Results revealed that groups composed of initially cooperative members were more 
likely to form cooperative group decisions than groups composed of non-cooperators. This 
effect was however, eliminated when the demonstrable optimality of mutual cooperation was 
high. That is, as it became easier to demonstrate the advantages of this alternative, group 
discussion as able to encourage cooperation, even in the face of an initial unanimous 
preference to appease self-interest.  
The nature of a social dilemma is that arguments for the individually rational choice 
can be seen to be of equal merit as arguments for the mutually cooperative choice. However, 
as Hopthrow and Abrams (2010) demonstrate when arguments for individual rationality are 
in conflict with pro-social arguments, the collectively rational preference can prevail. This 
asymmetry alludes to the presence of a shared conceptual system (Laughlin, 1980) 
undergirding the perceived optimality of mutual cooperation. This system, we suggest, 
comprises of certain, mutually accepted beliefs and values in favor of mutual cooperation, 
which when articulated are more compelling than other behavioral alternatives. We suggest 
that such components may centre on moral values, in particular, norms of fairness and 
egalitarianism. Many dilemmas involve groups in which deservingness of the group members 
is the same for everyone and do not entail any role differentiation; no members are higher 
status than any others, and thus it is likely to be agreed that every member is entitled to the 
same outcome. Moreover, the norm of equality is very influential in many group settings (e.g. 
Deutsch, 1975). Specifically in social dilemmas group members often prefer equal outcomes 
(Rutte, Wilke & Messick, 1975) and see such division as the fair thing to do (Messick & 
Sentis, 1979). Therefore, are likely to agree that no one should profit at the expense of 
another, but everyone deserves a fair share.  Such norms and values prescribe for identical 
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action by the group. Since mutual cooperation ensures greater payoffs than mutual defection, 
this solution becomes optimal, and subsequently communication becomes a simple 
coordination tool.  
Paralleling Hopthrow and Abram’s (2010) argument, we suggest that values 
comprising the shared conceptual system become salient during group discussion and when 
articulated resonate with other members, giving power to the mutually cooperative outcome. 
Alternatively, arguments not shared by the group i.e. those in favor of individual opportunity 
at the expense of collective risk, are demonstrably less advantageous within the social 
situation and resultantly will be much less persuasive Expanding on the group problem-
solving account we additionally suggest that identification processes may facilitate this 
process. Specifically, we propose that the alteration of participants’ understanding of the 
dilemma in terms of increased concern for the group welfare initiated within the prior phase 
of discussion may serve to  increase the availability  of components of the shared conceptual 
scheme favoring mutual cooperation. As previously discussed, we do not believe group 
identification to represent a dichotomous state which initial discussion is sufficient to instil, 
rather we suggest that as the degree of identification increases, the optimality of arguments in 
favor of mutual cooperation become more obvious as the group become more relevant.  
To summarize, we argue that within the second stage of group discussion group 
members address different viewpoints of appropriate social behavior. The crucial occurrence 
within this stage of discussion is the development of an understanding of the optimality of 
mutually cooperation, enabled by a shared conceptual system amongst the group. We suggest 
that the sense of group solidarity established within the prior, orientation stage of discussion 
interacts to facilitate this process, with stronger identification increasing the availability of 
arguments favoring coordinated cooperation.  
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Consensus 
While the mutually cooperative solution is introduced to the group within the conflict 
stage of group discussion, we envision the third stage of the process model to be 
characterised by the formation of a cooperative group consensus as the majority of group 
members converge on this mutually acceptable alternative.  While the group problem-solving 
explanation of the group discussion effect contributes to our understanding of the 
mechanisms by which this consensus is initiated, the effect of this consensus on cooperative 
behavior is elaborated by the perceived consensus explanation of the group discussion effect.  
According to this approach group discussion offers group members the opportunity to 
develop to a perceived consensus to cooperate (Bouas & Komorita, 1996, Kerr & Kaufman-
Gilliand, 1994).  Such coordination of behavior is said to reduce the fear of exploitation and 
risk associated with the cooperative choice, as well as establishing a normative belief that 
others too expect them to commit to this consensus.  While it was originally argued that this 
cooperative consensus needs to be unanimous amongst group members (Orbell et al., 1988), a 
less stringent view is now customary that a majority consensus is successfully elicits 
cooperation (Bouas & Komorita, 1996; Braver & Wilson, 1986). Indeed, as research within 
the jury decision-making literature demonstrates, ostensibly unanimity decisions often 
actually represent a majority decision with an acquiescing minority (e.g. Waters & Hans, 
2009).  
Research supporting the idea that commitment to a group consensus increases 
subsequent cooperation is plentiful. Orbell et al. (1988; Experiment 1) for instance, presented 
participants with a public good dilemma in which they could choose to either keep their 
personal endowment or surrender it for the benefit of other group members. After completing 
a period of task-relevant group discussion, the experimenter surprised participants by telling 
them that the beneficiaries of any endowments donated to the collective fund would actually 
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be members of a yoked group, rather than their own. Regardless of this disclosure, 59% of 
participants who engaged in group discussion choose to donate their endowment, compared 
to only 30% of participants in the control condition.  
 In a similar fashion Braver and Wilson (1986) presented discussion groups with a 
dilemma that required 3 out of the 9 group members to contribute their personal endowment 
in order for each non-contributing group member to gain a bonus.. It was observed that each 
group choose to hold a lottery to determine which group members should surrender their 
endowments. Despite investment decisions remaining completely anonymous, 71% of 
individuals who were selected in the lottery subsequently donated their endowments. It seems 
that in both of these experiments, group discussion served to establish a ‘social contract’ 
(Braver & Wilson, 1986) leading group members to honor their commitments regardless of 
the beneficiaries of their actions (Orbell et al., 1988). 
A further investigation from Bouas and Komorita (1996) employed group discussion 
and common fate manipulations in a four-condition design to test the competing the group 
identity and perceived consensus explanations. Each of the three experimental conditions 
commenced the experiment by completing an adaptation of Kramer and Brewer’s (1984) 
common fate manipulation, shown to successfully bolster group identity. While one 
experimental group completed only the common fate manipulation, two experimental 
conditions subsequently engaged in either task-relevant or task-irrelevant group discussion. If 
group identification was driving the group discussion effect, it was hypothesized that all three 
experimental conditions would induce higher cooperation relative to the control / no-shared 
fate condition.   
Results revealed that group discussion further increased the level of group 
identification measured with Hinkle and colleagues’ group identity scale (GIS; Hinkle, 
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Taylor, Fox-Cardamone & Crook, 1989), relative to participants who only completed the 
common fate manipulation and those in the control condition. However, while group identity 
was equally high within both discussion groups, cooperation was significantly higher in the 
task-relevant, than task-irrelevant discussion condition. Accordingly, Bouas and Komorita 
(1996) concluded that while group discussion may increase group identity, identification is 
not sufficient to elicit cooperative behavior without individuals perceiving a consensus to 
cooperate amongst group members. 
In a similar vein, Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland (1994) exploited the moderational role 
of the efficacy of the cooperative choice (for review see Kerr, 1996) in order to tease apart 
perceived consensus and group identification processes. The authors reasoned that if the 
group discussion effect is driven by increased identification with one’s group we would 
expect to see an interaction whereby group members choose to cooperate to the extent that 
the cooperative choice is capable of increasing the group’s welfare. If the effect is driven by 
commitments to a group consensus to cooperate, however, would we expect participants to 
honor these commitments regardless of how efficacious their contribution is for providing a 
public good (“If I promised to cooperate, I should do so, even if my cooperation turns out to 
have little impact”, Kerr & Park, 2001, p. 119). In line with predictions, the authors observed 
that group discussion significantly increased rates of cooperation compared to baselines, and 
this effect was not moderated by the efficacy of the cooperative choice. That is, even when 
the cooperative choice held little weight for ensuring the attainment of the provision point for 
the public good to be provided, cooperation was still 30% higher in the discussion than a no 
discussion control condition. Although group identification accounted for some variance, the 
effect of discussion persisted when self-reported group identity was entered as a covariate.   
However, while both Bouas and Komorita (1996) and Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliand 
(1994) present evidence against a sufficient role of group identity mechanisms, neither rules 
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out the role of identification within this stage. With the group identity explanation suggesting 
that discussion serves to increase the utility of others welfare, while the perceived consensus 
explanation focuses on the role of individual preferences, the two explanations have 
previously been understood as mutually exclusive. We argue, instead that the two processes 
work more interactively within this stage of consensus formation.   
Indeed, Dawes and colleagues (Dawes et al., 1990; Orbell et al., 1988) do not dispute 
that discussion leads to a cooperative consensus. They do argue, however, that it is group 
identity rather than consensus that directly mediate cooperation.  Chen (1996) similarly 
suggests that recognition that the group is consensual may serve to induce an enhanced state 
of perceived interdependence and common fate, increasing the value individuals place on 
their group membership and thus, increasing the likelihood of cooperation. This logic would 
however, predict a boost in cooperation within Bouas and Komorita’s (1996) task-irrelevant 
discussion condition where both consensus and high identification are present. Such an effect 
was not apparent. Accordingly, we suggest that the alternative path is more plausible by 
which feelings of group identity precede and motivate members to commit to a consensus for 
mutual cooperation which then more directly influences cooperative behavior (Orbell et al., 
1988).  
In sum, we suggest that within the third stage of group discussion appropriate social 
behavior is agreed upon as the majority of group members converge on the mutually 
cooperative alternative. This cooperative group consensus serves to create an expectation that 
other group members will cooperate and an accompanying normative belief that others too 
expect them to honour this consensus.  Furthermore, we suggest that previously established 
increases in group identification function within this stage to increase individuals’ inclination 
to commit to the cooperative consensus.  
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Group Decision 
While we suggest the optimality of mutual cooperation is first recognised within the 
conflict stage of group discussion and the majority of the groups converge on this alternative 
within the consensus stage, we define a final stage of discussion within which these processes 
cumulate in a group decision to cooperate. Internalised commitment processes are said to 
operate within the final stage to ensure that this group decision to choose cooperatively is 
translated into individuals’ personal binding choices.  
The final stage of group discussion characterises the point at which group members 
are able to declare “this is what we are going to do” and task achievement, at least at a group-
level, is completed. While the group process-solving approach agrees that a consensus-based 
process underlies the communication effect, it is argued that a crucial outcome of this 
consensus is a group decision in favor of the cooperation, serving to enable a robust 
communication effect (Hopthrow & Abrams, 2010; Hopthrow & Hulbert, 2005). While 
consensus formation within the prior stage of discussion yields only a perceived distribution 
of preferences; the expectation of mutual cooperation can be cemented when a group decision 
to cooperate is rendered, providing a more tangible, formal basis for cooperative action.   
Hopthrow and Hulbert (2005) provide evidence consistent with this notion. The 
authors presented discussion groups with the same six-player prisoner’s dilemma game and 
randomly assigned them to high or low demonstrability conditions (as per Hopthrow & 
Abrams, 2010). Following discussions, groups were asked to make an explicit group decision 
about how members should choose before indicating their private, binding decisions. Results 
confirmed that individual’s post-discussion choices were significantly more cooperative than 
pre-discussion choices. Moreover, no pre-discussion differences were found between the high 
and low-demonstrability conditions. However, post-discussion cooperative group decisions 
were more likely when the demonstrability of the cooperative choice was high. Crucially, 
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such group decisions significantly increased the proportion of cooperation in individuals’ 
post-discussion individual choices.  
The finding that cooperative group decisions enables a stronger group discussion 
effect can be interpreted as evidence that group decisions serve to activate an internalized 
commitment norm.  Evidence of this norm is provided by Kerr and colleagues (Kerr et al., 
1997; Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994).  The authors argue that discussion-induced 
cooperation is mediated by an internalised, personal commitment norm, rather than a social 
norm dependent on external censure (e.g., Bicchieri, 2005; Bicchieri & Lev-On, 2007).This 
norm is closely related to individuals’ desire to maintain consistency between their beliefs 
and their behavior (Cialdini, 1984). 
Support for this notion comes from Kerr et al. (1997).  Within this experiment 
discussion groups received instructions regarding a step-level public goods dilemma and 
were randomly assigned to anonymity or non-anonymity conditions. All groups were 
informed that their group discussions concerning the dilemma would be videotaped whilst the 
experimenters left the room. In the anonymity condition, the experimenters returned to the 
room following the discussion presenting a destroyed cassette and explaining that the VCR 
had malfunctioned and accordingly the discussion had failed to be recorded. Individuals in 
the anonymous condition were additionally told that no one’s investment decisions would 
ever be individually identified, whilst those in the non-anonymous condition were informed 
that each individual group member’s decision would later be revealed to the group.  
Results revealed that cooperation rates were equally high in the discussion groups 
regardless of anonymity condition. Accordingly, it was concluded that group members are 
bound to their mutually cooperative commitments by a predominately internalized 
commitment norm (“Even if others could not know that I had broken my commitment, I 
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would know”; Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994, p.526). We suggest that individuals can 
personally commit to the cooperative choice at any point upon presentation of the dilemma, 
from which point we would expect internalised commitments to prescribe behavior. 
However, we expect such commitments to be most pervasive amongst the group within this 
final stage of discussion as the group establish a collective commitment to the cooperative 
choice in the form of a cooperative group decision.  
To summarise, the final stage of group discussion is reached when the mutually 
cooperative solution has gained enough support for a group decision to choose this alternative 
to be rendered. We argue that this decision serves to cement a previously established 
perceived consensus, providing a more tangible basis for cooperative action.  This final group 
decision stage signals task completion at the group level and most closely precedes individual 
behavioral action. Internalised commitments are said to function in between this group 
decision and individual binding choices to ensure that the group decision to cooperate is 
maintained within individuals’ private and anonymous personal choices.  
Iterated dilemmas.  
Social dilemmas often do not entail ‘one-shot’ decisions but involve groups in 
sustained relationships that repeatedly encounter the same social dilemmas. Other process 
models of group decision-making including Kerr’s (1981) Social Transition Scheme suggest 
that group members can progress in a non-stationary fashion towards convergence on a 
decision. We similarly suggest that when discussion groups are faced with an iterated 
dilemma, the stages of the process model progress in a more recursive fashion (see Figure 1).  
Research has shown that continuous or repeated communication between trials 
ensures the most robust communication effect within iterated dilemmas (Frolich & 
Oppenheimer 1998; Isaac & Walker, 1988; Ostrom, Walker & Gardner, 1992). For example, 
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within one investigation participants were paired with either a human confederate or a 
computer to take part in a prisoners’ dilemma task with six rounds. Pre-trial discussion was 
permitted in only four of these rounds. Results demonstrated that cooperation rates dropped 
significantly in the no communication rounds relative to the communication rounds (Parise, 
Kiesler, Sproull & Waters, 1996). It therefore seems that cooperative intents may not always 
carry over when communication discontinued. Accordingly, we argue that when group are 
able to reach a cooperative group decision which is translated into subsequent individual 
behavior, and groups receive feedback to this effect, groups return through the consensus and 
group decision stages of the process model within subsequent trial discussions. Doing so 
allows group members to confirm the expectation that other group members will sustain their 
cooperative behavior and form a personal commitment to do the same.   
Alternatively, research shows that when groups fall short of mutual cooperation, pre-
trial or continuous discussion is used is to communicate disapproval of other member’s 
defection (e.g. Frohlich & Oppenheimer, 1998). Jerdee and Rosen (1974) for instance, 
attribute the effective of continuous communication within iterated dilemmas to the 
transmission of “counter-reinforces”, such as messages of social disapproval in response to 
defection. We therefore interpret this as evidence that feedback of low levels of cooperation 
within the group returns the group to a stage of conflict within which group members 
reconsider what constitutes appropriate behavior and attempt to achieve a more coordinated 
pursuit of mutual cooperation.   
IV. Contributions of the Process Model of Group Discussion 
 
Support for the process model of group discussion.  
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The process-model of group discussion represents a new, intuitive and accurate 
account of past research. As we have shown, the available evidence does not allow the role of 
any of the mechanisms subsumed within our model to be ruled out. Even tests designed to 
competitively separate the effects of divergent accounts actually point to the conclusion that 
these multiple mechanisms work interactively to drive the communication effect. The present 
review integrates these previously competing explanations into a subsuming process model of 
group discussion.  
We do not perceive any of the stages outlined above to independently be sufficient to 
enable the robust communication effect that is routinely observed. Rather, evidence for each 
contributory mechanism is incorporated within a series of stages, which are said to 
cumulatively enable a more powerful communication effect (see Table 1).  If discussion is 
terminated after only the orientation phase of discussion, we would expect to observe a slight 
increase in cooperation relative to no discussion baselines which can be attributed to 
increases in group solidarity and a resultant reordering of priorities. If discussion progresses 
to the conflict stage we expect further increases in cooperation as group members come to 
recognise the optimality of cooperation. Cooperation levels would further increase if the 
consensus stage is reached as the risk associated with the cooperative choice is reduced. The 
communication effect will be most powerful however, if a group decision is to cooperate is 
formed as a result of this consensus, enabling the most robust communication effect.   
While we do not envision completion of all stages of the process model to be 
necessary to raise cooperation relative to no-discussion baselines, we do argue that groups 
must progress through these stages in the unitary sequence we set out. In this respect each 
stage forms a necessary element of a sequence enabling an incrementally stronger 
communication effect.  We are confident in the order we define, because, logically, the 
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sequence articulated within our process model represent the only way in which the specified 
mechanisms can combine to facilitate cooperative behavior.  
In order for individuals to address a conflict between individual and social rationality, 
individuals must first have a representation of the collective and an understanding of the 
nature of interdependence between group members which is established within the preceding 
orientation stage (i.e. without representing the collective there can be no conflict between the 
individual and that collective). Stages of conflict and disagreement between alternative 
courses of action that appeal to competing individual and social rationality must, in turn, 
precede stages within which agreement and consensus is reached as the majority of group 
members come to favor the mutually cooperation outcome (i.e. consensus cannot precede the 
very conflict that gives rise to the consensus). Finally, a cooperative group decision signifies 
the completion of consensus formation and emerges as a result of this group process when 
the mutually cooperative solution has gained enough support for a group decision to be made.  
Convergent support for this sequence defined within the process model of group 
discussion is provided by the concordance between the steps we articulate and that depicted 
within empirically verified models of group development Paralleling models of group 
development, we define an initial orientation stage of discussion focused around achieving a 
common task understanding. Tuckman (1965) argues that as a consequence of this common 
understanding a shared group identity begins to emerge.  We similarly suggest that this initial 
discussion initiates a transformation of self-perception from the individual-level towards the 
group-level with resultant reordering of priorities. Tuckman describes the second stage of 
group development as a phase of disagreement as individuals challenge each other’s 
perspectives and try to assert their own personal needs rather than accepting the groups’ 
influence. In a similar fashion, we also describe a lack of unity within the second stage of the 
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process model as groups address a conflict of interest between individual and social 
rationality.  
Groups are said to begin to accept the vital contribution of other members and 
develop mutual clarity with respect to the task at hand within Tuckman’s (1965) third, 
norming stage of group development. We similarly envision the third stage of the process 
model to be characterised by the formation of a cooperative group consensus as the majority 
of the group come to favor this alternative.  Finally, while Tuckman describes autonomous 
group members working independently towards achieving the agreed upon group goals 
within the fourth, performing, stage of group development, we similarly describe an 
internalized commitment to function within this final stage of discussion to ensure that the 
groups cooperative consensus is translated into individuals personal behavior even when the 
threat of external censure is absent.   
Framework for future research.  
The group discussion effect is founded upon research utilising small laboratory 
groups, containing between two and nine discussants.  While trends in the effect size across 
these studies can be observed (Balliet, 2010), no research, to our knowledge, has directly 
examined whether the group discussion effect generalises to groups larger than those which 
can be recruited in experimental settings. The theoretical reasoning within our process model 
would predict the discussion effect to persist within moderately large groups as the chance 
that the group contains at least a minority who recognises the optimality of the mutually 
cooperative outcome is increased.  However, when group sizes become very large, the 
coordination required for progression through stages of consensus and group decision is 
difficult to establish, and we would therefore expect the communication-cooperation 
relationship to weaken.  
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Additionally, research underlying the group discussion effect is based on discussion 
manipulations of different time limits. Research has been unable however, to conclusively 
determine how this variant may moderate the communication-cooperation effect size (Parks 
& Cowlin, 1995) Our model would predict a generally stronger communication effect when 
discussion time is ample, as groups are afforded opportunity to progress through more 
facilitating stages providing a cumulatively stronger effect on cooperative behavior.   
Similarly, the group discussion effect is founded upon research conducted on groups 
formed on an ad-hoc basis who have had no prior contact. Our model would predict an even 
stronger effect of discussion however within pre-formed groups. It could be predicted that 
groups will travel faster down the road to convergence when they are more accustomed to 
working together (Kerr, 1981). For instance, within pre-formed groups as the orientation 
phases of discussion may be more quickly completed allowing greater opportunity to 
progress through subsequent stages. Further research should be conducted to provide 
empirical support for these hypotheses generated by our process model and reciprocally 
broaden the scope of the group discussion paradigm.   
The Problem of Application 
While clarifying the theoretical basis of the group discussion effect is crucial, 
identifying ways of promoting cooperative behavior is more than just a theoretical issue. The 
problem arises because despite the enormous potential of the group discussion effect for 
increasing social harmony, the solution inherently possesses limited utility beyond the 
laboratory for simple reasons of practicality. Cooperation is a function of group interaction, 
yet, many real-world dilemmas are not faced by small, face-to-face groups. Direct 
communication among all decision makers does not represent a feasible solution within such 
large groups extended in both space and time (Messick & Brewer, 1983). Crucially, this 
situation typifies some of the most pervasive dilemmas we face (such as energy conservation 
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or recycling; national level concerns that rely in individuals’ behavior change). Indeed, even 
if group sizes are small enough to allow direct communication amongst all decision-makers, 
(i.e. dilemmas restricted to local communities) direct discussion can be costly and logistically 
difficult. Providing public space for such communication represents a public good dilemma 
in itself (Bicchieri & Lev-On, 2007).  
Messick and Brewer (1983) note that in light of such restraints, research must 
progress to take what we know about why discussion alters group members’ choice behavior 
and consider alternative ways to produce the same effects. However, despite the increasingly 
great societal need for interventions to promote individual restraint, coupled with the 
potential for discussion-based interventions to increase social harmony, surprisingly little 
research has been conducted to this aim. Rather than accepting the inevitability of the 
premature closure of research, we argue that we should look to advance indirect means in 
order to capitalise on the benefits of the group discussion effect without the limiting 
requirement of collocation.   
However, while indirect discussion-based strategies may represent the only pragmatic 
means of capitalizing on the benefits of the group discussion effect, they will inevitability 
produce weaker effects than direct discussion itself (Fazio, Powell & Herr, 1983). We 
therefore suggest that such interventions should be firmly grounded in an integrated 
theoretical model, allowing us to harness the combined benefits of multiple contributing 
factors and thus increasing the efficacy of these more pragmatic interventions to approximate 
direct communication effects.  We now discuss a number of possible platforms to achieve 
this aim, providing a much more optimistic view concerning the application of the group 
discussion effect than is common in the literature.   
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Discussion between representatives. Laboratory studies have shown that 
communication among subgroups within a larger group can successfully increase rates of 
cooperation. Braver and Wilson (1986) for instance, found that when discussion was 
permitted prior to investment decisions within, but not between subgroups of three 
individuals, cooperation was significantly higher (75%) than the no communication control 
condition (48%). We perceive this partial communication effect to have important, yet 
unexplored applications for large dilemma groups and groups communicating over long 
distances (e.g. multinational organizations).  
One possible solution stemming from these findings is the establishment of 
communication network amongst group representatives. Such spokespersons could be 
elected by the group to form a representative, deliberative democracy. Although the 
mechanisms underlying the partial communication effect are not well defined, we would 
expect the subgroup to progress through the standard stages of the process model of group 
discussion. Following discussions, representatives can communicate the proceedings of the 
discussion to the larger group in a more pragmatic, indirect and uni-directional manner. 
Doing so may allow the crucial mechanisms underlying direct discussion effects to be 
vicariously established within the entire group. Legitimate representatives will, for instance, 
be able to instil a common understanding of task requirements amongst members and 
demonstrate the optimality of the mutually cooperative solution. Just as individuals feel 
obligated to group decisions established via direct communication, so too would we expect 
individuals to feel bound to group decisions agreed by democratically elected discussants on 
their behalf.  
Inherent in this strategy, however, is the risk of a second-order dilemma (Ostrom, 
1990).It is not in individual’s self-interest to expend their own effort or time to engage in 
communication if their contribution is not crucial to enjoy its benefits. If, however, all group 
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members reason accordingly and decline to represent the group, no one will enjoy rewards of 
communication. Establishing less costly forms of indirect communication in which all group 
members could feasibly participate may bypass this potential caveat. .  
Computer mediated communication.  One such alternative is computer-mediated 
communication (CMC). With the advance of globalized communications infrastructures 
within our lifetime it is not uncommon to maintain contact with friends, family and 
colleagues electronically.  The idea of capitalising upon this opportunity to increase 
cooperative behavior within dilemma situations is receiving increasing research attention (for 
review see Bicchieri & Lev-On, 2007). Two forms of CMC used to this aim can be 
conceptually distinguished; those which operate an entirely text-based programme, and those 
that additionally incorporate audio-visual elements.  
Initial research has supported the utility of text-based CMC to improve cooperation 
relative to no-discussion baselines. Jensen, Farnham, Drucker and Kollock (2000) for 
instance found that participants permitted to communicate using a text-to-speech interface 
were significantly more cooperative in a dyadic prisoner’s dilemma game than those in a no-
communication control condition. Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1998) similarly found that 
participants contributed significantly more of their endowment in a continuous public goods 
game on trials when they were allowed to communicate with group members via email, than 
on trials where no communication was permitted. Unfortunately, however, the magnitude of 
these effects typically fails to approximate that of direct, face-to-face group discussion 
(Balliet, 2010).  
 Videoconferencing CMC may hold more promise, however, with initial evidence 
suggesting that such methods can produce comparative levels of cooperation as face-to-face 
discussion (Bos, Olson, Gergle, Olson & Wright, 2002; Brosig, Ockenfels & Weimann, 
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2003).  In a similar vein to our argument that indirect discussion-based techniques should be 
firmly grounded in an integrated theoretical model, Bicchieri and Lev-On (2007) argue that 
the success of videoconferencing CMC lies precisely in the medium’s ability to support more 
of the required elements of the direct discussion effect.  
Nevertheless, despite its promise to overcome physical distance between group 
members, methods of videoconferencing cannot overcome temporal distance between 
discussants. Additionally, while the requirement for all participants to contribute towards the 
discussion within CMC interventions successfully avoids a second-order dilemma, 
antecedents of social loafing can be more prevalent within online groups than real groups 
(Piezon & Donaldson, 2005). If individuals begin to notice that certain group members are 
not responding to emails or engaging in virtual discussions these actions may be construed as 
free-riding on others efforts, resulting in a collapse in effort and thus preventing the benefits 
of discussion being realised.. We propose that one means of overcoming these limitations 
may be to tailor indirect discussion-based strategies to the individual-level, rather than group-
level.  
Establishing mediating factors independently. Establishing the mediators of the 
communication effect independent from any form of discussion represents the most intuitive 
way to replicate the effects of the group discussion at the individual-level. Unfortunately, this 
currently represents an underspecified solution. Our process model provides a clear depiction 
of the underlying mechanisms that interventions should aim to establish.  
Firstly, we argue that discussion serves to increase identification or solidarity amongst 
group members. Such identification may be manipulated independently from discussion, for 
instance, by inducing perceptions of common fate within environmental campaigns (Kramer 
& Brewer, 1984), reminding individuals that the consequences of issues such as 
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environmental degradation and resource depletion pertain to all members of society.  
Secondly, our model suggests that cooperation is facilitated by the emergence of an 
understanding of the optimality of mutual cooperation. Replicating this effect outside of 
discussion strategies may entail the presentation the arguments for the “correctness” of 
collectively rational behaviors, for instance in the form of information campaigns detailing 
the status of depleting natural resources. We suggest that a stage of consensus serves to 
reduce the risk associated with the cooperative choice and engage normative pressure to 
conform to this norm. Applications integrating household energy usage information within 
social networking mediums, making individuals adherence to the cooperative consensus 
public, may offer promise in this sense. Finally we suggest a group decision to cooperate 
serves to activate an internalised commitment norm ensuring that this decision is translated 
into individuals’ personal, binding choices. Strategies maximising dissonance between 
defective behaviors and internalised beliefs may be applicable here.  
Establishing mediating factors independently, absent of any form of discussion may 
help overcome the problems pertaining to group-level strategies. However, as we argue 
within this review, each mediator of the direct discussion effect works within in a necessary 
sequence to enable a cumulatively stronger effect on cooperative behavior. Accordingly, for 
this strategy to be maximally effective, mediating factors must be induced within this defined 
order, a feat that may prove logistically difficult, costly and time-consuming.  
Imagined group discussion. Rather than implementing individual interventions to 
recreate each stage of discussion in turn could we just simulate each stage? Mental simulation 
can be defined as the “imitative representation of some event or series of events” (Taylor, 
Pham, Rivkin & Armor, 1998, p.430). A promising body of research demonstrates the power 
of simulation techniques for a wide range of phenomena within nearly every domain of 
psychology (for review, see Crisp, Birtel & Meleady, 2011). There has, however, been no 
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investigation into the impact of mental simulation within the social dilemmas literature, yet 
there are good reasons to think that such integration would be beneficial.  
Crucially, research demonstrates that mentally simulating social situations can elicit 
the same attitudinal, affective and behavioral effects as the actual experience itself. For 
instance, replicating the bystander apathy effect, Garcia, Weaver, Moskowitz and Darley 
(2002) found that participants who imagined going out for a meal with ten others were 
subsequently less likely to help the experimenter by participating in a second experiment than 
those who imagined going out for a meal with just one other person. Similarly, Turner, Crisp 
and Lambert (2007) demonstrated that imagining a positive interaction with an out-group 
member improved out-group evaluation, mediated by reduced intergroup anxiety, the same 
affective process triggered by actual intergroup contact (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Likewise, 
Stathi and Crisp (2008) found that imagined contact also facilitates projection of positive 
personality traits, the same cognitive process that mediates the contact-bias relationship 
(Pettigrew, 1998). In line with these findings, we suggest that positive mental simulation of 
each of the crucial stages underlying the group discussion effect according to our process 
model will serve to activate conscious processes that parallel those normally associated with 
face-to-face group discussion, and thereby eliciting cooperative behavior.  
We propose that imagined group discussion represents a versatile and inexpensive 
strategy lending itself to application within societies’ most imperative dilemmas. Water 
conservation campaigns, for instance, may productively encourage individuals to simulate the 
stages of the process model in cooperative manner, producing a perceived consensus among 
community members to reduce their water consumption.  Increasing the availability of this 
decision serves to clarify the nature of the social problem and will reduce individual’s 
perceptions that their individual efforts will be in vain. Public television channels that rely on 
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viewer contributions for their continued existence could similarly incorporate imagery 
techniques within funding drives to generate normative pressure to uphold a simulated 
consensus amongst viewers to make a donation.  The blood donation service may also 
incorporate methods of imagery into their appeals, facilitating the development of an 
internalised commitment amongst observers to uphold their intentions to become donors. In 
this way we suggest simulation of the stages of the process model of group discussion will 
serve to practically establish the cognitive groundwork for the cooperative choice.  
Furthermore, research has demonstrated that after imagining a hypothetical future 
behavior, participants express greater intentions to engage in the activities (Carroll, 1978; 
Crisp et al., 2010; Pham & Taylor, 1999; Ross, Lepper, Strack & Steinmetz, 1977; Sherman, 
Zehner, Johnson & Hirt, 1983). Accordingly, we further predict a secondary effect of 
imagined group discussion whereby imagery interventions serve to increase individuals’ 
inclination to seek out opportunities for more powerful, face-to-face negotiation when 
opportunities are available (e.g. by attending community meetings or focus groups). 
Advancing imagined group discussion interventions therefore represents an important agenda 
for future research. 
Conclusions 
The comfortable perception that our individual efforts towards maintaining social 
harmony are dispensable no longer bears scrutiny. Widespread concerns from environmental 
degradation, to elimination of the budget deficit, to over-population, serve as compelling 
reminders of the urgent need for research to find means to encourage individuals to sacrifice 
self-interest in favor or more cooperative, socially responsible behavior. Amongst this 
research one robust finding has emerged; a period of task-relevant discussion amongst 
decision-makers significantly increases rates of cooperation.  
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Borrowing Pruitt and Kimmel’s (1977) expression, we perceive that research 
specifically focused upon this group discussion effect is ‘alive’, but its health is doubtful. 
While it is beyond empirical dispute that group discussion robustly increases rates of 
cooperative behavior, research has failed to establish a ‘process-orientated’ theoretical 
framework explaining this effect. The present review draws a line under existing competitive 
tests of ‘single-cause’ accounts and provides a more complete theoretical picture of how 
interrelated factors combine to facilitate cooperation within group discussions.  Aspects of 
each of the previously competing explanations of the group discussion effect are subsumed 
within the model and are said to make incremental, cumulative contributions towards 
cooperation in a sequential fashion within four stages of orientation, conflict, consensus and 
group decision.  
The process-model of group discussion represents a new, intuitive and accurate 
representation of past research. We argue that, logically, the sequence articulated within our 
process model represents the only way in which mechanisms can combine to facilitate 
cooperative behavior. The concordance between the steps we articulate and that depicted 
within empirically verified models of group development provides convergent support for our 
model. The process model of group discussion also represents an important new area of 
theoretical understanding and potential exploration; our hope is that it will serve as a 
theoretical framework or grounded theory, guiding future analysis of group interactions. 
Finally, the review considered the problem of lack of opportunity for direct discussion 
as an explanation for the shortage of applied research. Rather than accept the premature 
closure of applied research, we argue that we should look to advance indirect means to 
capitalise on the benefits of the group discussion effect without the limiting requirement of 
collocation. Crucially, we argue that grounding such indirect strategies in our integrated 
process model will increase the efficacy of these more pragmatic solutions, bringing research 
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surrounding the group discussion effect back in line with Pruitt and Kimmels’ (1997) and 
Komorita and Parks’ (2005) prescriptions. In so doing this may allow the benefits of group 
discussion to be realized in the most pressing real-world dilemmas we face, from the 
interpersonal to the international. 
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